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EDITORIAL
 The financialisation of global health [version 1; referees: not
peer reviewed]
Felix Stein , Devi Sridhar
Usher Institute of Population Health Sciences and Informatics, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, EH8 9AG, UK
Abstract
Global health is increasingly reliant on financial markets. The ongoing
financialisation of global health raises new questions of governance, which we
expect to affect policy makers as much as doctors, nurses and patients in the
years to come. In this editorial, we will first explain what is meant by
financialisation, then illustrate its nature in the field of global health   threevia
examples, and end by highlighting some of the governance issues that the
financialisation of global health raises.
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What is financialisation?
Financialisation refers to “the increasing role of financial motives, 
financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in 
the operation of the domestic and international economies”i. In 
global health, it means that financial motives, markets, actors 
and institutions increasingly determine which kinds of healthcare 
are available to people in need.
The rise of finance has been ongoing at least for the past four 
decades, and spans different aspects of socio-economic life. 
In macroeconomics, financialisation points to the increas-
ing frequency, size and profitability of financial transactions as 
compared to non-financial ones, such as manufacturingii. In busi-
ness studies, the term denotes the increasing share of financial 
activities as part of overall business revenues and profits, the 
growing importance of the stock market, and the rise of share-
holder value as the primary indicator of corporate successiii. In 
anthropology, financialisation points to the fact that monetized 
debt relationships are becoming increasingly prominent in peo-
ple’s daily lives, via the growth of consumer debt, microcredit 
initiatives, savings clubs and debt collection agenciesiv,v.
Financialisation in global health
Many examples exist of financialisation within global health 
- here we highlight three: The rise of international agencies 
operating as financial mechanisms, the World Bank’s recent crea-
tion of the Pandemic Emergency Financing facility and ongo-
ing suggestions to actively turn population health into a financial 
market indicator.
The rise of financial mechanisms – Gavi and the 
Global Fund
A first example for the financialisation of global health is the 
increasing involvement in the field by powerful financial mecha-
nisms. While the World Health Organization (WHO) had been 
created in 1948 to direct and coordinate health work world-
wide, it has in the past been notoriously underfundedvi. Its 
annual budget of around $4.4bnvii compares unfavourably to the 
annual $7bn of the American Center for Disease Control for exam-
pleviii. Partially as a result of its financial weakness, the WHO’s 
work has in recent decades been complemented by new global 
health institutions, such as Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance and the 
Global Fund to fight HIV/AIDS, TB and Malariaix. Gavi does not 
engage in policy assistance or applied healthcare work as much 
as the WHO. Instead, it constitutes a platform through which the 
world’s poorest countries can aggregate their demand for vaccines 
to improve vaccine availability and to lower pricesx. Gavi thus 
operates explicitly as a financial mechanism that leaves the 
practical work of vaccination and other forms of applied health-
care to others. The Global Fund equally describes itself as “a 
financing institution [that does] not implement programs on the 
ground”xi. It essentially works by raising money from donors, 
spending it based on country-demand and then assessing the 
impact of this funding on specific outputs such as number of 
bednets or antiretrovirals distributed. Despite already having a 
Joint UN Programme for HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), the WHO, and 
large bilateral programmes such as PEPFAR, the Global Fund 
was nevertheless created as a channel for money specifically for 
three diseases.
Pandemic Emergency Financial Facility
A second example for the financialisation of global health 
is the World Bank’s recent establishment of the Pandemic 
Emergency Financing Facility (PEF), an international health insur-
ance against pandemic outbreaksxii,xiii. The insurance, meant to 
cover country governments and humanitarian relief agencies is 
in part financed by so-called pandemic catastrophe bonds, issued 
by the Bank’s treasury. Broadly speaking, investors on capital 
markets can buy the right to hold on to these bonds for a pre-
determined period of time, during which they risk losing their 
invested money if a pandemic breaks out. In return, donors are 
meant to compensate investors with annual interest payments 
for as long as the bonds are held. By creating the PEF, the Bank 
responds to the ongoing financialisation of the world economy, a 
trend which has resulted in trillions of dollars being available 
on capital marketsxiv. In the light of these extraordinary sums 
the World Bank itself is getting less relevant as a lender, and has 
begun to reinvent itself as a broker for private sector investmentxv. 
The PEF thereby serves as an example for how private money on 
capital markets may in the future be directed into healthcare 
for the world’s poorest populations.
Economic investment based on metrics on resilience
Lastly, an influential report on financing pandemic risk reduction 
by the International Working Group on Financing Preparedness 
(IWG) has recently argued in favour of developing and promoting 
global metrics that reflect country-wide pandemic risk. These 
metrics – so the report argues – should then be presented to 
financial actors and private sector management. They are expected 
to reward countries with healthy populations, whilst remaining 
reluctant to invest in high-risk locations. This is meant to pres-
sure the governments of poor countries to invest in healthcare. 
As the report puts it, “the most powerful way to […] create more 
direct incentives for investment in preparedness is to ensure 
that the risks attaching to infectious disease outbreaks are reflected 
in financial markets and businesses’ investment decisions”xvi. 
Concrete suggestions of how to make pandemic risk legible for 
investors include standardizing and promoting its measurement, 
including it in IMF and World Bank country assessments 
and incorporating it into the work of credit rating agenciesxvii.
Implications of financialisation
A similarity in the efforts and institutions mentioned so far is 
that they consider the world of finance and the world of global 
health to stand in a largely virtuous relationship with one another: 
Financial markets are deemed to be good for health, as they chan-
nel money into healthcare at unforeseen speed and scale and 
because they may discipline governments and companies around 
the globe into taking healthcare seriously. At the same time, glo-
bal health is considered to be good for finance, since healthy 
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populations are needed for macroeconomic growth and healthcare 
can even in developing countries provide new opportunities for 
profit making on capital marketsxvi xviii. What is more, financial-
ising global health seems to be a pragmatically useful way of 
dealing with an increasingly financialised world overall. As the 
head of the World Bank recently put it: “Our top priority should 
be to systematically de-risk both projects and countries to ena-
ble private sector financing, while at the same time ensuring 
that these investments benefit poor countries and poor people”xiv.
The financialisation of global health raises new governance 
issues that have become well established in fields other than 
health, and that are likely to matter for global health governance 
during the years to come. We highlight three of these.
Firstly, financial markets present new challenges in terms of 
transparency and accountability. On the one hand, this is because 
confidentiality agreements of private investors tend to render 
their investment strategies, risk assessment models, datasets, 
internal reports and institutional structures secret. While the use 
of public sector funds can at least in theory be traced and inves-
tigated, the same is not true for most private sector moneyxix. 
On the other hand, its lack of accountability is due to the recent 
explosion of new financial instruments, which make it hard for 
analysts, legislators and investors (as well as healthcare profes-
sionals and patients) to understand how the world of financial 
products works in detail, whether and under which circumstances 
funds for healthcare will be provided, and when the involvement 
of new investors actually furthers people’s health, rather than 
undermining it.
Secondly, financial markets are notorious for boom and bust 
cycles. As the 2008 global financial crisis has shown, invest-
ment innovation can suddenly destroy large amounts of money 
just as easily as it can create them. Since financial technologies 
such as corporate shares, government bonds or new financial instru-
ments depend largely on the narratives that exist around them, 
their value can rise and fall rapidly as changes in these narratives 
become widely acceptedxx. Thus, in financializing global health, 
we expose healthcare provision of the world’s poorest popula-
tions - for better or worse - to the narrative-based convictions 
of financial investors. In the abovementioned case of the PEF 
for example, private sector investors will only provide health 
coverage against pandemic outbreaks only as long as they believe 
that buying PEF bonds is the best use of their money.
Lastly, financial instruments are not morally neutral. Instead, 
they influence which kinds of healthcare we deem possible, per-
missible or desirable. Michael Sandel has provided examples for 
thisxxi. He shows that life insurance was originally invented to 
enable family breadwinners to ensure the wellbeing of their kin, 
even in the unfortunate event of their own death. As such it was 
a technology with explicitly circumscribed moral goals. Yet, 
when major American employers started taking out life insurance 
on hundreds of thousands of their employees, making a profit 
when current or former employees passed away, life insur-
ance turned from an expression of care and families’ financial 
security to a largely detached bet on the demise of mostly 
unknown peoplexxi xxii. Similar moral tensions exist in the viaticals 
industry, as part of which terminally ill people can sell their 
life insurance policies to investors for a reduced but immediate 
pay-out. Such bargains allow the former to have a dignified end 
of life, yet they also enable investors to profit directly from the 
death of terminally ill people as long as they pass away within 
pre-defined time framesxxiii.
What these three examples show is that there is no a priori vir-
tuous relationship between finance and healthcare. Thus, whether 
or not the ongoing financialisation of global health will indeed 
improve healthcare for the world’s most vulnerable people will 
depend on the regulatory structures within which it expands. 
In any case, scholars and practitioners will need to take the 
analysis of global health financing much more seriously.
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